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1±1 
LEWIS AND QUEEN (a Partnership) et al., Appellants, v. 
N. M. BALL SONS (a Partnership) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Licenses-Contractors.-A partnership which actually under-
took to "construct a highway" for another partnership acted 
as a contractor within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 7026. 
[2] Contracts-Effect of Illegality.-Whatever the state of the 
pleadings, when the evidence shows that plaintiff in substance 
seeks to enforce an illegal contraet or to reeover compensation 
for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to 
aseertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly 
lend its assistance to the consummation or encouragement of 
what public policy forbids. 
[3] !d.-Effect of IUegality.-It is immaterial that the parties, 
whether by inadvertence or consent, do not raise the issue of 
an illegal contract at the trial, since the court may do so on its 
own motion when the testimony produces evidence of illegal-
ity; and it is not too late to raise the issue on motion for new 
trial, in a proceeding to enforce an arbitration award, or even 
on appeal. 
[ 4] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Invalidating Instrument.-The 
parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence showing that a 
contract lawful on its face is in fact part of an illegal 
transaction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856.) 
[5] Contracts-Effect of Illegality: Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence 
-Invalidating Instrument.-The policy in favor of narrowing 
the issues in dispute, which normally confines the court to 
those made by the pleadings, and the policy of the parol 
evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness of integrated written 
instruments, both give way before the importance of discour-
aging illegal conduct, since to this end the trial court must 
be free to search out illegality lying behind the forms in which 
the parties have cast the transaction to conceal such illegality. 
[6] Licenses-Contractors.-A partnership which acted as a con-
tractor under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7026, did not substantially 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Licenses, § 41; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 47 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, §§ 98, 99; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 210. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 272; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1098. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6-8] Licenses, § 21.1; [2, 3] Contracts, 
§76; [4] Evidence, §384; [5] Contracts, §76; Evidence, §384; 
[9-13, 15-21] Licenses, §58; [14] Contracts, § 79. 
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comply with the requirement of § 7028, making it unlawful for 
any person to act in the capacity of a contractor without 
having a license therefor, because one partner held an individ-
ual license, since the "person" that did the contracting work, 
namely, the partnership, had no license. 
[7] Id.-Contractors.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7029, expressly re-
quires individual licensees who eng·age jointly in the contract-
ing business to obtain an additional, joint license. 
[8] Id.-Contractors.-The fact that a licensed partner of a 
contracting business supervised actual construction work did 
not make it less necessary for the other partner to procure a 
license, though his activities may have been confined to book-
keeping and the search for new business, since the statutory 
provisions setting forth the qualifications for a license and 
the causes for disciplinary action against licensees show that 
the Legislature was as much concerned to protect the public 
from dishonesty and incompetence in the administration of 
the contraeting business as in the actual use of bricks, mortar 
and earthmoving equipment (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7068, 7069, 
7120) and furthermore show that, if the contraetor is a part-
nership, the experience, knowledge and integrity of each 
partner is a vital eonsideration in determining whether to issue 
a license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7067, 7069, 7071.) 
[9] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-A partnership which 
entered into a subcontract to supply equipment, remove con-
crete and apply water on a parkway construction job, but 
whieh did not comply with the licensing statute, cannot "bring 
or maintain any action in any court of this State for the 
collection of compensation." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031.) 
[10] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Though the gen-
eral contractor for whom an unlicensed partnership performed 
work on a parkway construction job was paid in full by the 
state, it was not required to turn over to the partnership the 
proceeds from the state contract attributable to the partner-
ship's labor, since, even in the absence of a prohibitory statute 
such as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, the courts generally 
will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assistance to 
a party who seeks compensation for an illegal act; the consid-
eration that the contractor may be left in possession of some 
benefit which it should in good conscience turn over to the 
partnership is outweighed by the importance of deterring 
illegal conduct. 
[11] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 7031, represents a legislative determination that the im-
portance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in 
the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the 
parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by 
Mar. 1957] LEWIS & QuEEN v. N. JVI. BALL SoNs 
[48 C.2d 141; 308 P.2d 713] 
143 
denying violators the right to maintain any action for com-
pensation in the courts. 
[12] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-An action by an 
unlicensed partnership against a contractor to enforce di-
rectly an illegal contract for work on a parkway construction 
job, not merely to obtain an accounting for profits arising 
from one, falls squarely within Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, 
preeluding recovery for work done in the capacity of con-
tractor by one who is not licensed. 
[13] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-The courts may not 
resort to equitable considerations, such as unjust enrichment, 
in defiance of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, precluding recovery 
for work done in the capacity of contractor by one who is 
not licensed. 
[14] Contracts-Effect of Illegality-Parties not in Pari Delicto. 
-vVhen the Legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain 
conduct for the purpose of protecting one class of persons 
from the activities of another, a member of the protected class 
may maintain an action notwithstanding the fact that he has 
shared in the illegal transaction; the protective purpose of 
the legislation is realized by allowing plaintiff to maintain his 
action against a defendant within the class primarily to be 
deterred, and in such situation plaintiff is not in paTi delicto. 
[15] Licenses-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-The class 
protected by a licensing statute includes those who deal with 
a person required by the statute to have a license, and sub-
contractors are not always in the class to be protected simply 
because they are subcontractors. 
[16] Id,...:_Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-When the person 
required to have a license is a general contractor, the protected 
class includes subcontractors, materialmen, employees and 
owners dealing with the general contractor. 
[17] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-When the person 
required to have a license but did not have one is a subcon-
tractor, he is not to be protected from his own unlicensed 
activities; to allow him to recover would destroy the protection 
of those who dealt with him, and they are in the class the 
Legislature intended to protect whether they are owners or 
general contractors. (Disapproving Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal. 
App.2d 821, 281 P.2d 524.) 
[18] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-An unlicensed sub-
contractor may not maintain an action against a general con-
tractor for work performed simply because the action is 
against a licensed member of plaintiff's own profession, rather 
than against the owner for whose benefit the work was done; 
general contractors as much as owners are entitled to raise 
the defense of lack of license in the subcontractor. 
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[19a, 19b] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-A subcon-
tractor who did not have a contractor's license at the time 
work was performed under a subcontract may not maintain 
an action against sureties on labor and material bonds posted 
by a licensed general contractor in compliance with Gov. 
Code, § 4200, and on stop notice bonds posted by such con-
tractor pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1184e (now § 1192.1), 
since the subcontractor's object is to obtain by indirect means 
compensation for unlicensed work. 
[20] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Actions to enforce 
an arbitration award and to foreclose a mechanic's lien are 
within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, precluding 
recovery for work done in the capacity of contractor by one 
who is not licensed. 
[21] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-In an action by an 
unlicensed subcontractor against sureties on labor and material 
bonds posted by a licensed general contractor in compliance 
with Gov. Code, § 4200, and on stop notice bonds posted by 
such contractor pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1184e (now 
§ 1192.1), the defense of illegality is available to a surety 
if it is available to his principal; the obligation of the sureties 
on such bonds was not to pay for labor merely by virtue of 
the fact that it had been expended on a construction job, but 
was an obligation to pay only if the subcontractor established, 
without reference to the bond, a legal and valid claim for 
compensation. ( Civ. Code, § 2810.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County and from an order denying a new trial. Chris 
B. Fox, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order dis-
missed. 
Action for damages for breach of equipment rental agree-
ments, for reasonable value of equipment alleged to have been 
held beyond agreed rental term, and on labor and material 
bonds and on stop notice bonds. Judgment for defendants 
affirmed. 
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Appellants. 
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Gordon Johnson and 
Dario De Benedictis for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs George W. Lewis and Paul C. 
Queen are engaged in the contracting business as the partner-
ship of Lewis and Queen, hereinafter referrrd to as plaintiff. 
Defendant Ball Sons, hereinafter referred to as defendant, 
is also in the contracting businesR. 
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In June, 1949, defendant was awarded two contracts by 
the state, each contract for the construction of a separate 
section of the Hollywood Parkway. Defendant then entered 
into four contracts with plaintiff. With respect to the work 
to be done on each section of the parkway, there were two 
contracts between plaintiff and defendant. The first was 
entitled a "subcontract," and under it plaintiff agreed to 
remove concrete encountered during excavation of the road-
way and apply water needed in the process of compacting the 
ground. The second was entitled an" equipment rental agree-
ment," and under it plaintiff agreed to provide defendant 
with construction equipment for road excavation, ''overhaul,'' 
and compacting. 
Plaintiff brought this action for damages for breach of the 
equipment rental agreements and for the reasonable rental 
value of equipment alleged to have been held beyond the 
agreed rental term. Plaintiff also sought to recover against 
sureties on labor and material bonds posted by defendant in 
compliance with Government Code, section 4200, before com-
mencing work on the parkway, and stop notice bonds posted 
by defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 
1184e (now § 1192.1) after the present dispute arose. De-
fendant answered denying that it had breached the rental 
agreements, and filed a cross-complaint in which it alleged a 
breach of the agreements by plaintiff and sought to recover 
overpayments made to plaintiff. 
The trial court found that before the execution of the rental 
agreements plaintiff and defendant had entered into an 
oral agreement that plaintiff would undertake as a single 
subcontract the removal of concrete, application of water, 
excavation, overhaul, and compacting of original ground. De-
fendant then discovered that if it subcontracted all of this 
work, it would violate provisions in its contracts with the 
state that required it to perform with its own organization 
work of a value of not less than fifty per cent of the value 
of all the work embraced in the state contracts. The parties 
agreed therefore, with the intention of circumventing the 
provisions in the state contracts, to divide the five items of 
work under each state contract between two writings, a sub-
contract and an equipment rental agreement. Notwithstanding 
the form of these writings, it remained the agreement of the 
parties that plaintiff would perform all five items of work 
as an integrated subcontract operation. 
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There was substantial evidence to support these findings. 
The rental agreements themselves provided for compensation 
based on the number of cubic yards of earth moved or square 
yards compacted rather than on the period of time during 
which defendant had use of the equipment, and the rental term 
was the time required to do the work called for by the state 
contracts. Testimony indieated that plaintiff furnished and 
retained control over both operating and supervisory em-
ployees, that it moved equipment to and from other jobs 
without defendant's consent, and that it carried on the work 
under both subcontracts and rental agreements with the same 
personnel, equipment, and accounting. Defendant paid wages, 
payroll taxes, and compensation insurance for employees 
operating the machines, but these costs were charged against 
amounts owing plaintiff under the rental agreements and so 
ultimately were borne by it. Monthly progress reports from 
defendant to plaintiff were on a single form and made no 
segregation between charges attributable to work under the 
rental agreements and charges attributable to work under 
the subcontracts. The evidence, especially the testimony of 
Stanley Ball, tended to show that for all practical purposes 
the work was conducted by plaintiff, and that defendant exer-
cised only such control as was necessary to coordinate the 
various subcontractors working on the parkway. 
The trial court concluded that plaintiff had agreed to act 
and had in fact aeted as a contractor within the meaning of 
section 7026 of the Business and Professions Code, and that 
because it had done so without the license required by section 
7028, it was barred by section 7031 from maintaining any 
action for compensation. Lewis had an individual license, 
but neither Queen nor the partnership of Lewis and Queen 
had licenses. The court held, in the alternative, that the 
rental agreements were unenforceable because they violated 
the provisions in the state contracts against subcontracting 
more than a certain amount of the total work. Since we 
have concluded that plaintiff's failure to obtain a license pre-
vented it from maintaining any action for compensation, we 
have no cause to consider this alternative ground. The court 
entered judgment for defendant on the complaint and for 
plaintiff on the cross-complaint. Plaintiff appeals from the 
judgment against it.* 
*It also purports to appeal from an order denying a new trial. Such 
an order is not appealable, but may be reviewed on an appeal from a 
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 956.) 
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Section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code makes 
it unlawful for "any person to engage in the business or act 
in the capacity of a contractor within this State without 
having a license therefor .... '' Section 7026 defines a con-
tractor as ''any person, who ... does himself or by or through 
others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, 
move, wreck or demolish any building, highway, road ... or 
improvement. . . . '' ''The term contractor includes sub-
contractor .... '' Section 7030 makes it a misdemeanor for 
any person to act in the capacity of a contractor without a 
license. Section 7031 provides that, "No person engaged in 
the business or aeting in the capacity of a contractor, may 
bring or maintain any action in any court of this State for 
the collodion of compensation for the performance of any 
ad or contract for which a license is required by this chapter 
without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed con-
tractor at all times during the performance of such act or 
c.ontraet.'' 
Pnrthermore, section 7025 states that the "person" re-
quired to have a license by section 7028 includes a partnership, 
and sedion 7029 makes it unlawful for two individuals, "each 
of whom has been issued a license to engage separately in 
the business ... of a contractor ... to jointly ... act in 
the capacity of a contractor ... without first having secured 
an additional license for acting in the capacity of such a 
joint venture or combination .... " 
[1] The evidence shows that in spite of the form of the 
rental agreements plaintiff actually undertook to and did in 
fact "construct a highway" for defendant, and thereby acted 
as a contractor within the meaning of section 7026. (See 
Albaugh v. Moss Constr. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132-133 
[269 P.2d 936] ; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 51 Cal.App.2d 340, 343 
[124 P.2d 835] ; cf. Harrison v. Shamalian, 110 Cal.App.2d 
500 [243 P.2d 82] ; Andrew v. Conner, 101 Cal.App.2d 621 
[225 P.2d 943] .) 
Plaintiff contends, however, that because defendant ad-
mitted in its answer that equipment had been furnished under 
the written rental agreements, the trial court was precluded 
from finding that the actual agreements were subcontracts 
because it should have restricted its findings to the issues 
made by the pleadings. There is no merit in this contention. 
[2] Whatever the state of the pleadings, when the evidence 
shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal 
contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court 
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has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in 
order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the 
consummation or eneouragement of what public policy forbids. 
(Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal.2d 528, 532 [297 P.2d 961]; 
Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 629 
[204 P.2d 37] ; Fewel & Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85, 
92 [109 P.2d 650] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728 
[16 P.2d 673] ; Tevis v. Blanchard, 122 Cal.App.2d 731, 732-
734 [266 P.2d 85] ; see Owens v. Haslett, 98 Cal.App.2d 829, 
835-836 [221 P.2d 252] .) [3] It is immaterial that the 
parties, whether by inadvertence or consent, even at the trial 
do not raise the issue. The court may do so of its own 
motion when the testimony produees evidenee of illegality. 
(Norwood v. Judcl, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 277-278, 282 [209 
P.2d 24] .) It is not too late to raise the issue on motion for 
new trial (Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Standard American 
Dredging Co., 184 Cal. 21, 23-24 [192 P. 847] ), in a proceed-
ing to enforce an arbitration award (Franklin v. Nat C. Gold-
stone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 629 [204 P .2d 37]), or even on 
appeal. (Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733-734 [203 P. 
760] .) In the present ease the issue was in fact raised 
during the trial. 
Equally without merit is plaintiff's contention that because 
the rental agreements stated that they contained all pro-
visions agreed to by the parties, the parol evidence rule pre-
eluded the admission of other evidence showing the true 
nature of the agreement betweeen the parties and that plain-
tiff had in fact aeted as a contractor. [4] The parol evi-
denee rule does not exelude evidenee showing that a contract 
lawful on its face is in fact part of an illegal transaction. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 
728 [16 P.2d 673] ; May v. Herron, 127 Cal.App.2d 707, 710-
711 [274 P.2d 484] ; Kennerson v. Salih Brothers, 123 Cal. 
App.2d 371, 374 [266 P.2d 871]; De Armas v. Dickerman, 108 
Cal.App.2d 548, 551-552 [239 P.2d 65] .) [5] The policy 
in favor of narrowing the issues in dispute, whieh normally 
confines the court to those made by the pleadings, and the 
policy of the parol evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness 
of integrated written agreements, both give way before the 
importance of discouraging illegal conduet. To this end, the 
trial eourt must be free to search out illegality lying behind 
the forms in which the parties have east the transaction to 
conceal such illegality. 
[6] Plaintiff contends that even if it acted as a con-
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tractor under section 7026, it substantially complied with the 
requirement of section 7028, since Lewis held an individual 
license. The "person" that did the contracting work, and 
was required by section 7028 to have a license, however, was 
the partnership of Lewis and Queen, and it had no license. 
Nor did Queen individually. [7] Section 7029, furthermore, 
expressly requires individual licensees who engage jointly in 
the contracting business to obtain an additional, joint license. 
(Of. Joseph v. Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 578 [225 P.2d 504]; 
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765,773 [242 P. 90].) 
Undoubtedly there are situations in which substantial com-
pliance with the licensing requirements satisfies the policy of 
the statute. (See Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 
Cal.2d 687, 689-691 [166 P.2d 265]; Citizens State Bank of 
Long Beach v. Gentry, 20 Cal.App.2d 415, 419-420 [67 P.2d 
364]; ef. Oddo v. Iledde, 101 Cal.App.2d 375 [225 P.2d 929] .) 
The facts of the present case, however, with one partner 
licensed individually and no partnership license, are precisely 
those in Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603 [204 P.2d 
23], and in that case we said, "There can be no question but 
that this case presents a clear violation of the statutes regu-
lating the contracting business." (33 Cal.2d at 607; see also 
Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158-159 [150 P.2d 
3]; Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 335-336 r67 P.2d 
114].) We distinguished Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 
Inc., supra, on the ground that there both partners held in-
dividual licenses and during the performance of the contract 
a joint license was issued to them and a third person, and 
Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v. Gentry, s~tpra, on the 
ground that in that case, although the plaintiff's license ex-
pired while the work was in progress, it was renewed in the 
name of a corporation controlled by him. 
In both the Gatti and Gentry cases, any matter that might 
have formed the subject of inquiry by the licensing board in 
determining whether to issue an additional license was neces-
sarily considered in connection with the licenses actually 
issued. In the present case, however, the board has never 
determined the qualifications of Queen. [8] Plaintiff claims 
that this makes no difference, because it was I.Jewis who super-
vised the actual construction work and Queen merely kept 
the books and sought out new business for the partnership. 
But the statutory provisions setting forth the qualifications 
for a license, and the causes for disciplinary action against 
licensees, show that the Legislature was as much concerned 
ViO LEwis & QuE-EN v. N. 1\L BALL SoNs r 48 o.2c1 
to protect the public from dishonesty and ineompetence in 
the administration of the contracting business as in the actual 
use of bricks, mortar, and earth-moving equipment. (E.g., 
§§ 7068, 7069, 7120.) Plaintiff's insistence that Queen knew 
nothing about actual construction simply emphasizes the im-
portance of the board's passing on his qualifications to <'ngage 
in any aspect of the contracting business. The statute makes 
it elear, furthermore, that if the contractor is a partnership, 
the experience, knowledge, and integrity of each partner is a 
vital consideration in determining whether to issue a license. 
(E.g., §§ 7067, 7069, 7071.) Finally, it is not clear that 
Queen's activities were in fact confined to bookkeeping and 
the search for new business. He participated with lJewis in 
the negotiations that led to the execution of the contracts, 
and he "walked the job," apparently to determine what prob-
lems would be eneountered if the work was undertaken. The 
conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff did not substantially 
comply with the lieensing requirements. 
[9] Since plaintiff did not comply with the statute, it 
cannot "bring or maintain any action in any court of this 
State for the collection of compensation. . . . '' ( § 7031 ; 
Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Oal.2d 603 [204 P.2d 23].) 
[10] Plaintiff contends, nevertheless, that because defendant 
has been paid in full by the state for all work rlone on the park-
way, justice requires that it be compelled to turn over to 
plaintiff the proceeds from the state eontraets attributable to 
plaintiff's labor. 
One answer to this contention is that, ev<m in the ab-
sence of a provision such as section 7031, the <'Onrts gen-
erally will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assist-
ance to a party who seeks eompensation for an illegal aet. 
The reason for this refusal is not that the courts are unaware 
of possible injustice between the parties, and that the defend-
ant may be left in possession of some benefit he should in 
good conscience turn over to the plaintiff, but that this con-
sideration is outweighed by the importance of deterring 
illegal conduct. Knowing that they will receive no help from 
the courts and must trust completely to each other's good 
faith, the parties are less likely to enter an illegal arrange-
ment in the first place. (See Takeuchi v. 8chrnuck, 206 Cal. 
782, 786-787 [276 P. 345]; JJiay v. Herron, 127 Oal.App.2d 
707, 712 [274 P.2d 484] ; Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Oal.App.2d 
382, 388 [205 P.2d 67] ; Wise v. Radis, 74 Oal.App. 765, 778 
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[242 P. 90] ; Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio 
Defendentis, 71 hQ.Hev. 254, 266-268.) 
In some cases, on the other hand, the statute making 
the conduct illegal, in providing for a fine or administrative 
discipline excludes by implication the additional penalty in-
volved in holding the illegal contract unenforceable; or effec-
tive deterrence is best realized by enforcing the plaintiff's 
claim rather than leaving the defendant in possession of the 
benefit; or the forfeiture resulting from unenforceability is 
disproportionately harsh considering the nature of the ille-
gality. In each such case, how the aims of policy can best 
be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and the particu-
lar facts involved. (See Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 
472, 481-482 [267 P.2d 59]; John E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. 
v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 278-280 [11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L.R. 
641] ; 6 Corbin, Contracts 964-967 ( 1951) ; 2 Pomeroy, Equity 
Jurisprudence 137 (5th ed. 1941); Grodecki, In Pari Delicto 
Potior Est Cond,itio Defenclentis, 71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 268.) But 
we are not free to weigh these considerations in the present 
case. [11] Section 7031 represents a legislative determina-
tion that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from 
engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness 
between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be real-
ized by denying violators the right to maintain any action for 
compensation in the courts of the state (Kirman v. Borzage, 
65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158 [150 P.2d 3] .) :Moreover, even if we 
could take into account unjust enrichment of defendant, it 
is not at all clear that, had it reached the issue, the trial 
court would have found defendant indebted to plaintiff be-
yond what it had already paid. 
Norwood v. Jtldd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276 [209 P.2d 24], Galich 
v. Brkich, 103 Cal.App.2d 187 [229 P.2d 89], and Wold v. 
Lnigi Consentino &; Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854 [241 P.2d 
1032], do not support plaintiff's right to recover. Each of 
those cases involved an action by a partner or joint venturer 
to recover a share of profits arising from an illegal enter-
prise. It was held that, since the enterprise was terminated, 
since it was not illegal as such but only for want of a 
license, and since the action was not against a third person 
for whose protection the statute had been primarily enacted 
but against a partner or joint venturer, the purpose of the 
law would not be served by denying relief. We need not 
decide at this time whether an action for an accounting against 
a partner or joint venturer is "an action for the collection of 
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<'ompensati(m" within section 7031 (cf. Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal. 
App. 765, 775 l242 P. 90]) or, even if it is not, whether 
the i11direct encouragement of an illegal enterpriHe resulting 
from tbe allowanee of such an action is sufficient to outweigh 
the evil of unjust enriehment. (See Hooper v. Barrant,i, 81 
Cal.App.2d 570, 575-578 [184 P.2d 688] ; 32 A.L.R2d 1345, 
1387; \Yade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal 
'l'mnsactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 294-296; but see Denning v. 
'l'aber, 70 Cal.App.2d 253, 257-260 [160 P.2d 900].) 
[12] The present action is against a third party, and is to 
enforce directly an illegal contract, not merely to obtain an 
accounting for profits arising from one. As Nm·wood v. Judd 
itself recognizes, this situation falls squarely within section 
7031. (93 Cal.App.2d 276, 283.) 
Plaintiff next contends that, by virtue of the fact that it is 
a subcontractor suing a general contractor rather than a 
general contractor suing an owner, neither section 7031 nor 
the general rule that illegal contracts are unenforceable bars 
its action. JJiatchctt v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281 P.2d 
524], appears to make this distinction decisive. In that case 
the Crane Service Company and the defendants, all unlicensed 
contractors, decided to undertake the demolition of buildings 
for a school district. The understanding between Crane and 
the defendants was that Crane would make the bid and 
defendants supply the funds to pay the school district; that 
the defendants would then do the actual work of taking 
down the bricks, using for this purpose Crane's machines, for 
which a reasonable rental would be paid; the defendants 
would pay Crane for removing concrete and rough-grading 
the site, and all salvageable material would belong to the de-
fendants. After the job was completed and the defendants had 
received all the revenues from the sale of salvage, they refused 
to pay Crane. Crane's assignee sued to enforce the contract. 
'fhe District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could 
recover in spite of section 7031. The first ground of its 
decision appears to be that, unless the plaintiff was allowed 
to recover the defendants would be unjustly enriched. 
[13] As we have already pointed out, the courts may not 
resort to equitable considerations in defiance of section 7031. 
As an alternative ground, the court reasoned that Crane had 
in effect assigned the school district contract to defendants 
and then become their subcontractor; that subcontractors are 
in a class for whose protection the licensing statute was en-
acted (relying on our statement in F'raenkel v. Bank of 
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America, 40 Cal.2d 845, 848 [256 P.2d 569], that the statute 
vvas designed ''for the prevention of fraudulent acts by con-
tractors resulting in loss to subcontractors, materialmen, em-
ployees, and owners of structures'') ; and that therefore a sub-
contractor can maintain an action on a contract with a general 
contractor, even though it is an illegal contract, because 
the subcontractor is not considered in pari delicto. (131 Cal. 
App.2d at 829.) 
[14] It is true that when the Legislature enacts a statute 
forbidding certain conduct for the purpose of protecting one 
class of persons from the activities of another, a member of 
the protected class may maintain an action notwithstanding 
the fact that he has shared in the illegal transaction. The 
protective purpose of the legislation is realized by allowing 
the plaintiff to maintain his action against a defendant within 
the class primarily to be deterred. In this situation it is said 
that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. ( Cader v. Seaboard 
P'inance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 574 [203 P.2d 758]; McAllister v. 
Drapeau, 14 Cal.2d 102, 112 [92 P.2d 911, 125 A.hR. 800] ; 
Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 662-663 [293 P. 26] ; Elmers 
v. Shapiro, 91 Cal.App.2d 741, 754 [205 P.2d 1052]; see 
Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 
71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 265; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired 
Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 268-270.) 
[15] But subcontractors are not always in the class to be 
protected simply because they are subcontractors, and we did 
not suggest otherwise in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal. 
2d 845, 848 [256 P.2d 569]. (See Albaugh v. Moss Constr. 
Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [269 P.2d 936]; Ilolrn v. Bram-
well, 20 Cal.App.2d 332 [67 P.2d 114] .) The class protected 
by the statute includes those who deal with a person required 
by the statute to have a license. [16] When the person re-
quired to have a license is a general contractor, then the 
protected class includes subcontractors, materialmen, em-
ployees, and owners dealing with the general contractor. 
[17] However, when the person who was required to have a 
license but did not have one is himself a subcontractor, such 
as plaintiff in the present case, he of course is not to be 
protected from his own unlicensed activities. To allow him 
to recover would in fact destroy the protection of those who 
dealt with him, and they are in the class the Legislature 
intended to protect whether they are owners or general eon-
tractors. (Cf. Hedlttnd v. Sutter Medical Service Co., 51 Cal. 
App.2d 327, 333 [124 P.2d 878]; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
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denee 142 (5th ed. 1941).) To the extent that it is contrary, 
the reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281 
P.2d 524], is erroneous and is disapproved. Under the facts 
of the present ease plaintiff is not in the elass to be protected, 
and therefore is not relieved from the imputation of being in 
pari delicto. Its failure to obtain a license, and not any fault 
of defendant in this regard, made the transaction illegal. 
[18] There is no merit in plaintiff's further contention 
that it may maintain this action simply because it is an action 
against a licensed member of plaintiff's own profession, rather 
than against the owner for whose ultimate benefit the work 
was done. General contractors as much as owners are entitled 
to raise the defense of lack of a license in the subcontraetor. 
If they were not, section 7031 vmuld be no deterrent to sub-
contraetors, since they generally do look to the general eon-
tractor for compensation. Yet section 7026, stating that "the 
term eontrador includes subcontractor,'' clearly imposes on 
unlicensed subcontractors the same disabilities as on unlicensed 
general eontractors. Cases from other jurisdictions cited by 
plaintiff (e.g., Dow v. United States, for Use and Benefit of 
Holley, 154lj1.2d 707,710 [lOth Cir.] ), do not involve statutory 
prohibitions like section 7031. 
[19a] Plaintiff's final contention is that, even if it cannot 
reeover on the rental agreements from defendant, the defense 
of lack of a license is not available to the sureties on the 
bonds. Section 7031 provides, however, that no person who 
acts as a contractor "may bring or maintain any action ... for 
the collection of compensation for the performance of any 
aet ... '' for which a license is required, without alleging and 
proving that he was licensed. (Italics added.) [20] We have 
already held that an action to enforce an arbitration award 
is an action within the meaning of this provision (Loving d'; 
Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 613 [204 P.2d 23] ; Franklin v. 
Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 631-633 [204 P.2d 
37]), and it is clear that an action to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien is also. (Albmtgh v. 111oss Constr. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 
126, 132 [269 P.2d 936] ; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233, 
237 [196 P.2d 585] ; Siemens v. Meconi, 44 Cal.App.2d 641 
[112 P.2d 904]; Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 334 
[67 P.2d 114] .) [19b] In view of the purpose of section 
7031, we can see no reason to distinguish an action on a bond. 
In all of these cases the object of the plaintiff is to obtain, morr 
or less directly, compensation for unlicrnsed work. The deter-
rent purpose behind section 7031 would be frustrated if the 
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plaintiff, prevented from obtaining compensation directly by 
an action on his contract, could obtain it indirectly by an 
adion on a bond. 
[21] Moreover, even in the absence of section 7031, the 
defense of illegality is available to the surety if it is avail-
able to his principal. (Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal.2d 528, 533 
[297 P.2d 961]; Rest., Security, § 117, comment d.) Lewis 
& Queen v. S. Edmondson & Sons, 113 Cal.App.2d 705, 707-
708 [248 P.2d 973], and Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fid. 
& Guar. Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733, 736-740 [46 P.2d 1000], which 
are cited by plaintiff, in spite of broad language in the opin-
ions do not hold otherwise. The obligation of the sureties on 
defendant's bonds was not to pay for labor merely by virLte 
of the fact that it had been expended on the parkway. It 
was au obligation to pay only if plaintiff established, without 
reference to the bond, a legal and valid claim for compensa-
tion. (See Civ. Code, § 2810; Flickinger v. Swedlow Engi-
neering Co., 45 Cal.2d 388, 393-394 [289 P.2d 214] ; Rest., 
Seeurity § 117, comment c.) This plaintiff has not done. 
Appeal from order denying motion for new trial dismissed. 
,Jndgment affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion, the strict construction placed upon Business 
awl Professions Code sections, particularly section 7031. by 
the majority is unwarranted. Section 7031 is but a statutory 
dedaration of the common law rule that a contract which 
Yiolates a statute designated for the protection of the public 
is Yoid and unenforceable. (Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 
[88 P. 825, 11 Ann.Cas. 661, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 575] ; Berka v. 
Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 [57 P. 777, 73 Am.St.Rep. 31, 45 
L.RA. 420] ; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 158, p. 652.) This 
rule, however, is not applied where to do so does not serve 
the intended purpose of the statute. (Wilson v. Stearns, 123 
Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [267 P.2d 59], citing Harris v. Rtlnnels, 
12 How. (U.S.) 79 [13 L.Ed. 901]; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 162, p. 657.) At one time in this state, statutes, such as 
section 7031, which expressly deny the enforcement of con-
traets which violate a particular law, were strictly construed 
to prevent recovery. (See e.g., Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 
765 [242 P. 90], involving a statute which prevented the en-
forcement of certain contracts by unlicensed real estate 
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brokers.) More recently, however, section 7031, although lit-
erally ap plieable, has not been applied where enforcement of 
the contract ~was eonsidered not to be adverse to the publie 
interest sought to be protected by the pertinent Business 
and Professions Code sections. (Gatti v. Highland Park 
Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687 [166 P.2d 265] ; Citizens State 
Bank v. Gentry, 20 CaLApp.2d 415 [67 P.2d 364]; Norwood v. 
Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276 [209 P.2d 24]; Galich v. Brkich, 103 
Cal.App.2d 187 [229 P.2d 89]; Wold v. Luigi Consentino & 
Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854 [241 P.2d 1032] ; Matchett v. Gould, 
131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281 P.2d 524] .) The effect of these eases 
is that the common law exceptions to the rule are recognized 
as being preferable to a strict, literal construction of the 
statutory language. Accordingly, the conclusion of the ma-
jority-that because plaintiff is within the statutory definition 
(subcontractor) and seeks recovery of his share of the pro-
ceeds arising from the work, it necessarily follows that recov-
ery must be denied-is based upon an incomplete analysis of 
the question presented. Rather, an examination should be 
made to determine whether the intended statutory purpose 
requires the denial of enforcement of this particular contract. 
Such an examination, it is submitted, demonstrates that the 
statute was not so intended. 
The facts of this case are quite similar to those in Norwood 
v. Judd, supra. There, plaintiff and defendant had formed a 
partnership to conduct a contracting business. Defendant was 
a duly licensed contractor but neither plaintiff nor the part-
nership was. Plaintiff brought an action to recover his share 
of the business proceeds from his partner. Literally, Business 
and Professions Code, section 7031, would have barred plain-
tiff's action as it provides, in part, that: "No person engaged 
in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, 
may bring or maintain any action . . . for the collection of 
compensation for the performance of any act or contract for 
which a license is required by this chapter without alleging 
and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all 
times during the performance of such act or contract.'' How-
ever, recovery was allowed and the court declared (93 Cal. 
App.2d at 286) that "It must be remembered that these 
licensing statutes are passed primarily for the protection and 
safety of the public. They are not passed for the benefit 
of a greedy partner who seeks to keep for himself all of 
the fruits of the partnership enterprise to the exclusion of 
another partner entitled to share therein. Where the illegal 
transaction has been terminated, public policy is not pro-
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or served by denying one partner relief against the 
other." It was further noted (p. 288) that Wise v. Radis, 
supra, (applying the strict rule of construction) had been 
overruled in legal effect. Defendant's petition for a hearing 
in the l\ or wood case was denied by this court. 
A similar problem was presented in Galich v. B1·kich, supra, 
103 Cal.App.2d 187. Plaintiff, apparently an unlicensed con-
tractor, entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement 
Yrith defendant. No license was obtained for the enterprise 
as required by Business and Professions Code, section 7029. 
In allowing recovery by plaintiff of the money due him for 
the contracting work performed by the venture, the court 
declared (p. 191) that "The contract in question was not per 
sc contrary to any statute; public welfare and safety were 
not threatened, and public policy would not be protected or 
served by denying one partner relief against the other." 
Applying the reasoning of the Norwood case, supra, the court 
observed that '' ... the rule that courts will not lend their 
aid to the enforcement of an illegal agreement should not be 
'blindly' extended to 'every case where illegality appears 
somewhere in the transaction.'" Defendant's petition for a 
hearing in this court was denied. 
In Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons, supra, 109 Cal.App. 
2d 854, the same problem was again presented. The applica-
tion of the statute was rejected, the court declaring (p. 857) 
that its main purpose was protection of owners. 
Recovery was allowed in these cases because the actions 
were not against those whom the statute was intended to 
protect, that is, an owner or other member of the general 
public who is without knowledge of or experience in contract-
ing affairs, and hence, is wholly dependent upon the compe-
tence of the contractor. Accordingly, the statute was not 
applied to allow an associate of an unlicensed individual to 
retain the proceeds rightfully owing to the latter. It seems 
clear that this principle is applicable here, despite the absence 
of a partnership or joint venture relationship, for in practical 
the circumstances are identical. Two parties agreed 
to perform work for a third party and one of the two has 
11·ithheld the other's share of the proceeds. Upon facts iden-
tir:al 1 o those in the present ease, the Second District Court 
of Appeal in M atchctt v. Goulrl, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 
applied tlw prineiple of the partnership cases and allowed 
rr:(,overy. In that case, neither plaintiff, a subcontractor, nor 
<lefendant, a general contractor, was licensed. Upon com-
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plntion of a contracting job for a third party, plaintiff sought 
the amount owing to him for the work performed. Analogizing 
to Norwood v . .J 1lCld, supra, the court allowed reeovery and 
deelared that the precise relationship between the parties, 
that is, whether partners or eontraetor and snbeontraetor, was 
not determinative and that the statute waR not intended to 
prevent recovery where the nuliccnscd contractor has eom-
plcted the job, where there is no serious moral turpitude in-
volved and where a denial of reeovery would permit unjust 
enriehment of one not intended to be protected, namely, the 
general contraetor. Citing Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 
Inc., supra, 27 Cal.2d 687, the court observed (131 Cal.App.2d 
at 829) that the statute was not intended as an "unwarranted 
:shield for the avoidance of a just obligation." 
Hero, the majority, to sustain their decision that plaintiff 
is precluded from enforeing his contract, concludes that the 
reasoning of Matchett v. Gat[ld, S?tpm, is erroneous, although 
a petition for hearing in that case was denied by this court. 
'rhe majority opinion further deelares that "To allow him 
[plaintiff] to recover would in fact destroy the protection of 
those who dealt with him, and they are in the class the Legis-
lature intended to protect whether they are owners or general 
contractors." What proteetion is to be afforded a general eon-
tractor? He is not in the position of a member of the public 
who desires contracting work performed and because of the 
disparity of knowledge and experience is extended statutory 
protection. Rather, his position is equal to that of the sub-
contractor and he is, therefore, able to judge the nature and 
quality of the subcontractor's performance for himself. If 
the statute was intended to "protect" a general contractor 
as a member of the public, as undeniably he is, then it should 
be applied to ''protect,'' from one another, members of a 
partnership which has illegally undertaken contracting work. 
It has been seen, however, that the statute is not construed in 
such a fashion. In the interests of just and consistent appli-
cation, it should not be so construed here. For this reason, 
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a 
determination of the cause on its merits. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appella11ts' petition for a rehearing was denied "''\pril 17, 
1957. CHrter, .T., a11d Sdwner, .T., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be gnmtecl. Gibson, C .• J., did not partici-
pate therein. 
